I was minding my own business, eating a light lunch in a Sacramento shopping mall and reading news on the mighty I-Phone. Imagine my shock to learn that Airbus Industries fly-by-wire flight controls may be dangerous! Holy Moly! Tell me it is not true! I read the article in full and was not surprised to learn that it was full of inaccuracies.
Anyway, I cannot abide such nonsense, so here we go... This will be a primer on the flight controls of the Electric Jet.
Note- for the most part, this blog does not go negative. This is what I call a Leisure Blog, i.e., something to do on overnights, nor does it get overly technical because I do not want to put the readers to sleep. Having said that...
Fi-Fi's flight controls
The Electric Jet utilizes fly-by-wire flight controls. That means that when the pilot, or the auto-pilot, sends a command to the flight surfaces (ailerons, elevator, stabilator, rudder, spoilers, flaps, slats), that command is an electrical impulse that activates a hydraulic servo or ram to move the control surface. There are numerous routes for the impulse to travel and there are three separate hydraulic systems to move the surfaces... Plenty of redundancy built into the flight control system. The fly-by-wire system is protected against outside electromagnetic pulses.
Here is where it gets tricky and throws some news reporters into a tizzy. When the pilot, or the auto-pilot, sends a command, it is evaluated by flight control computers. This is a very quick process; there is no perceptible lag from the time the pilot moves the stick, say to the left, and the left wing lowers. The reason the flight control computers take a look at the input is to attempt to keep the aircraft inside safe flight parameters. They try to keep the aircraft from what we call an upset. The protections will allow radical maneuvers, such as steep bank angles and high angles of attack if a need arises. But, if for some unknown reason, the aircraft is put into a dangerous attitude, Fi-Fi will attempt to help the pilot recover the aircraft with bank angle limits and overspeed or underspeed protection. It is a very good system and I do not feel limited by it in any way, shape, or form.
Also, if the aircraft gets into a low speed and low energy state, i.e., close to an aerodynamic stall, the flight computers will increase engine power and reduce angle of attack without pilot input. In fact, (pay attention: this is important) if all the protection values are operational, the aircraft cannot be stalled. That does not mean it cannot be crashed, though.
Example 1- Imagine you are cruising at 35,000 feet swapping flying stories with the co-pilot. The lead flight attendant rings and says your coffee is ready. The flight deck door is opened to hand over two cups of coffee and a screaming nut case dives into the cockpit, knocking the flight attendant into the center console, spilling hot coffee everywhere. The fight is on as the crew attempts to re-secure the flight deck. Someone's foot kicks the captain's joy stick, disconnecting the auto-pilot and sending Fi-Fi into an immediate left bank and nose down attitude. Anyone not seated with their belts fastened is in trouble. The flight envelope protections kick in and prevent the aircraft from rolling over on her back and keep the nose from pointing straight down. This gives the crew precious time to regain control of the aircraft and the flight deck.
Example 2- Imagine you are taking off at full gross weight, gear up, flaps retracting at about 2,000 feet above the ground. Your aircraft is accelerating when out of nowhere, a light aircraft is in your windscreen. Instinctively, you pull the stick back hard and to the right, trying to prevent a collision. The flight envelope protection system becomes your new best buddy in this situation. It will allow a steep bank angle and a nose high or nose low position, but will keep the aircraft from stalling, or rolling over during the frantic maneuver.
The flight envelope protection system has the ability to offer partial protection during equipment failure, such as a flight control computer. In cases of multiple failures, it is possible to have no protection, i.e., the flight controls revert to direct inputs to the control surfaces. In other words, the flight control protection always faults toward the pilot. A fault does not remove the pilot's ability to move the surface.
This wonderful system works in the background and is, for the most part, invisible. It cannot be normally turned on or off by the flight crew... Anyway, why would you want that?
Do not confuse the flight envelope protections with the navigation modes (lateral, vertical, and auto-thrust) that make The Electric jet such a wonder to fly. This aircraft is simply amazing in it's abilities to carry out the mission. Long time readers of this blog know that I refer to this as the Star Trek mode or as Smoke and Mirrors. All this magic can be turned off with a few button pushes causing the aircraft to revert back to the Super Cub mode... Poof! Stick, rudder, and manual thrust. Even in this basic mode, if all systems are in the green, the flight envelope protections will work.
Years ago, a major news outlet did a hit piece on the Airbus that was really out there in the ozone. To this day, I am still wondering why. Some of the things that were alleged were ridiculous. It was so bad, that Airbus had to create a response video that was distributed to training departments that operated their aircraft.
To prevent a misunderstanding here, I am not saying that the Electric Jet is perfect. I have thousands of hours in this baby and have flown it in horrendous conditions at the edges of the performance envelopes. I have seen several events that are head scratchers and have heard of others. Nor am I insinuating that Airbus aircraft are better than Boeing. As far as I am concerned, Boeing is the Holy Grail in aviation. I have thousands of hours in the 737-100/200/300 models, so I say that with some reverence.
OK, that is it for now. I hope this post was not too boring.
Life on the Line continues...
P.S. This comment just arrived from an Avionics engineer. It is written for the Line pilot, but since most readers of this blog are reasonably intelligent or you would not be reading it in the first place, you might find it interesting.
Hi Dave, As an Avionics Engineer of some 35 years spent mostly on corporate and commercial aircraft, I question how many people have seriously looked at the ADIRS computers in the A330/340. The ADS (Air Data System) and the IRS (Inertial Reference System) are completely seperate systems built into one box. The outputs of these two systems are used both seperately and summed to create a huge host of different data that is used by just about every other system on the aircraft. It is known by Airbus that the AOA (Angle of Attack) output from the ADIRU puts out erroneous data or "spikes" from time to time indicating up to 50deg nose up, and they have built certain algorithms into the PRIMS software of the primary flight control system (FCS) to filter these "spikes" out. However if 2 spikes are received that are within a certain time frame then the FCS will command a sharp nose down to recover from the stall indicated by the AOA. The ADS side of this system can be switched to another ADIRS system (3 onboard). The Airbus cure for the problem tells pilots to switch the IRS side instead. It is this error that caused the pilots of the Quantas A330 (VH-QPA) to continue to receive stall warnings and a host of other failures until they landed the aircraft an hour after the initial uncommanded nose down event. At high altitude the AOA measurement is sometimes the only indication that the aircraft is about to stall, or is already stalling, and hence the reason that the FCS will respond immediately and push the nose of the aircraft down when the AOA indicates a stall, In my opinion, only the software engineers at Airbuss will know what the FCS will do if the aircraft is in servere turbulance when an erroneous AOA output is acted on by the PRIMS. Further, the Yaw Damper System also receives data from the ADS and when in turbulance this system could be acting on erroneous data from the ADS and command large rudder movements that could cause the verticle fin to fail. Speculation in these circumstances is sometimes not a good thing, but sometimes it can highlight a weakness in an otherwise very robust system.
(name withheld)
48 comments:
Viewing cloud formations from any level gives me a sense of extreme euphoria. Thank you for posting pictures of clouds that I will never see from your perspective.
-"Because the wind is high, it blows my mind." -The Beatles
And my soul can fly with you as my eyes. Thank you!
Viewing the flight deck prompts me to ask about the left hand stick for the PIC. I'm a long time air simulator pilot and right handed. If the PIC is right handed does it present any problem in providing input via the left hand? As hundreds (?) have already said "GREAT Blog"
Cliffp
As always, incredibly informative, and a nice glimpse into the physics/mechanics of things for some of us non-pilots!
I found it fascinating reading! A little more understanding into how Fi-Fi works and what you can and cannot do! Thanks Dave - I'm off to Fligh tSimulator to see if my A3xx will allow my to do that! :)
If the Airbus system is good enough for you, then it's good enough for me! Since we often pick price/schedule/airline over type of aircraft, it is nice to share your confidence when we end up in an Airbus.
Nice to know there are these things in place to stop the plane stalling / rolling. Out of interest, if the plane rolls, is it possible to recover it? Sounds terrifying...
PS Cool pic of flight deck.
I don't like fly by wire systems. They are probably more reliable than whatever complex mechanical linkage is used in other aircraft. But they are electric, and electric stuff can become inoperative for any number of reasons that would not effect a mechanical system (mechanical wear is not one of them). Broken wires, lightening bolt to the computer, complete power failure, gremlins, hob-goblins, rats and poltergeists all affect computerized systems much more than mechanical ones.
As a computer scientist, the electronic parts of a jet and the fly-by-wire system in particular are of great interest to me.
No computer program is perfect. It just doesn't happen. Even if you use formal methods to mathematically prove the correctness of your program (which is so much work that it's only done on safety-critical systems like nuclear reactor control software) you can still make mistakes (just because you've proven something doesn't mean there's no mistakes in the proof itself).
Of course, much stricter engineering disciplines are used in the design and testing of something like a flight control computer than something like Microsoft Office. But again, it doesn't mean there's no mistakes.
A flaw in the control logic might mean the FCC makes the wrong decision, and as the anonymous avionics engineer indicated, incorrect input can lead even correct control logic to reach a wrong decision. It is for this reason that Boeing still lets the pilots have the last word.
However, Airbus's reasoning for making the computer have the last word is also sound: pilot error is a factor in many incidents. It's not easy to see which is the right answer, and I certainly don't claim to know it.
No matter how reliable these systems are, the possibility of malfunction must never be discounted, both by the pilots flying the plane and the investigators of an incident like this one. A blanket statement by the media that fly-by-wire controls are unsafe is, however, rediculous, I agree with you there.
Once upon a time, an open door to the flight deck was an opportunity (respectfully asked for) to enjoy the best seat in the house for a short time, to ask a few pertinent and intelligent questions of the non-flying pilot and to take in the vistas that appear so rarely for us in the back. What a tremendous PR tool for those Captains who were savvy enough. This blog comes pretty close to allowing some of us back in the jump seat.
Dave,
How many hours do you have in your logbook?
Really appreciate this post as I'm traveling across the pond in July - Airbus from Phoenix to Philadelphia and Boeing from Philly to London. Sounds like, aircraftwise, it's as good as it gets. Thanks for your never-boring blog.
This was an interesting entry. I say this even as a huge Boeing fan and non-Airbus fan (and not because of quality issues, but rather the way they and their European governments choose to make their decisions and run their business). I'm not of the idea that the limitations that the systems at hand on the Airbus you fly today are inherently unsafe, nor do I feel the need to criticize the limitations for keeping you from doing a barrel roll like the 367-80 once did.
For me, what is the most frightening thing the news media has put forth is the idea that all it takes is a couple faulty sensors to cause the plane to turn unintentionally suicidal. To me, this is no different from reports of the 777 having the fuel lines ice up. Both aircraft have been in service a good while now. I don't know about in Europe, but it seem that here in the US, the media handled the 777's issue better than it has handled the A330 issue. I'm not sure if Airbus and France are handling the release of information different than Boeing and Rolls Royce did, or whether journalistic bias is responsible. I'm certainly interested in finding out what really happened, but the fact is that we may never know for sure, and I think that may be a black cloud over the A330 and possibly Airbus as a whole in the eyes of the public, even though we both know that weather like this can sometimes cause losses that couldn't have been planned against unless we simply didn't fly in that weather at all. Not the solution the airlines or passengers really want, but you can't always have what you want.
Shortly after the Air Frace story broke, there was a "news alert" on a major US news network. The visibly excited anchor loudly announced that these Airbus aircraft have things called "pitot tubes" that Airbus chose to mount on the *outside* of the aircraft (the fools!) where Airbus has *just* discovered they could ice over! Airbus had decided to react to this previously unknown situation by replacing all the pitot tubes.
Was aviation reporting always garbage?
andrew- I am not sure... Somewhere around 20,000
tim 12 of 13- I have seen this video numerous times and yes I do know what happened. This is a perfect example of what I am talking about. The media really did a poor job of reporting on this incident. You must understand that the pilot can override the A320 anytime he or she wants to by disconnecting the auto-thrust or the auto-pilot or both. The A320 or any other Airbus aircraft cannot do anything contrary to what the pilot wishes. It can only help the pilot in certain unusual attitude recoveries.
This particular incident was a demonstration of the low airspeed handling (sort of) during a fly-by. The pilot evidently forgot that it takes turbines a few seconds to spool up to maximum thrust. You cannot shove the thrust levers forward on any jet engine and get immediate thrust; it takes a few seconds. SO, when he tried to climb over the trees, he waited too long to command full power. It had nothing to do with Fi-Fi's engines or computers. This was pilot error, pure and simple.
It is more exciting to suggest that computers took over control of the aircraft and flew into the ground.
clifford- it took me no time at all to get used to the left hand joy stick. It is totally intuitive.
Flight envelope protection is not new, of course. Older generation aircraft employed Rudder Travel Limiters to decrease rudder power as speed increases. And several non-fly-by-wire aircraft are equipped with "stick pushers" that automatically respond to perceived stall criteria.
Airbus just took this concept to the next level.
Dave, regarding this statement:
"The A320 or any other Airbus aircraft cannot do anything contrary to what the pilot wishes. " ...
re your postscript: (It is this error that caused the pilots of the Quantas A330 (VH-QPA) to continue to receive stall warnings and a host of other failures until they landed the aircraft an hour after the initial uncommanded nose down event),
This is the most troubling part of the current revelations of Airbus Protective systems precisely because they indicate a situation where the protections could not be selected OFF by the pilots.
Did I mis-read the report on that one?
Great post as always!
Hi Dave-
Great Blog.
I think I'm amongst the misinformed masses...hopefully you---or one of your readers---can clarify my question. I recall reading that Airbus Fly-By-Wire was as "perfect" as "perfect" could be...meaning that nothing could possibly occur that thrust the "electric jet" totally into the "dark"? So, all the "steam engine" stuff is not on the aircraft, which in turn means it weighs less, burns less fuel, fewer moving parts, greater reliability---more efficient. Obviously, the flight surfaces are powered via hydraulics etc---but all the pilots commands are via some computer interface that interprets the commands and then implements them. Basically something "techno" is always happening. Is that true? Also...I read that Boeing has all the "latest & greatest" on their airplanes, but that the ultimate fall back if everything fails is the "steam engine" stuff. What if any, opposed from the obvious like a side stick vs. a control column, are the differences in Boeing and Airbus technology? Like I said, I am probably totally uninformed---but I always figured that not much difference actually exists. Okay...2 more questions, that may be a bit dopey. In regards to commonality---does your A320 rating mean that it wouldn't take significant further training for you to obtain a rating on all other Airbus airplanes? Finally...you do a masterful job of simplifying and making flying, specifically the "electric jet", understandable...I am totally in a fog about the "normal law" (not even certain it is called that) and the other "laws" that are a premise for much of Airbus technology. Thanks Dave!
David
What you call 'Star Trek' mode I simply refer to as 'FM - F'ing Magic' as in when my wife asks "How does the GPS know where we are and the route to everywhere I want to go?" As much as I would like to explain geosynchronous satellites, triangulation and complex algorithms I just shrug my shoulders and reply "FM!"
"I hope this post was not too boring."
That, will be the day.
Thanks for the edge-of-my-chair reading.
If you just retyped the words FiFi, fuel, flight and turbulence I'd not be dozing off.
MCE team- Yep, there is usually techno magic going on, unless you are flying in "direct law" which is stick to flying surfaces with no envelope protection.
I have read that the latest Boeings are fly-by-wire. That is all I know for sure, since I have never attended ground school on them.
My A320 rating allows me to fly the 319/320/321. Ground school would be required for anything else.
Normal law means you are flying with full flight envelope protection; alternate law is partial protection (one or two of your computers has failed), direct law is no protection, but fully functional flight controls.
aluwings- nope, you did not miss read it. I read the same thing, although I do not know what steps they took as far as trouble shooting. I am not sure if the official incident report is out. I look at this as such: anything man builds will have worms in it somewhere.
Never boring Captain Dave...I like these technical entries a lot. They explain a lot to those of us who don't fly Fi-Fi regularly.
Loving that picture. Envying you the regular viewings of such sights, which I only glimpse once or twice a year (depending on the time of day we fly to our annual holiday).
Thanks to you I still have faith in Airbus aircraft, which is what our airline of choice (ie cheap and occasionally cheerful) uses. Otherwise I'd be headed for a wet holiday on a British beach instead of sun and sangria in Spain.
Dave , had you read this inform ?
http://www.crashdehabsheim.net/CRenglish%20phot.pdf
Observe that Michel Asseline , pilot of the aircraft , was leader of the Patruille de France . Top top aviator . Do you think this guy didn't know about spool his engines ..???
Dave, you said you wondered why a major media outlet would do a hit piece that was very inaccurate. The answer is, for ratings. Scare pieces draw viewers/readers. The reporters don't do the story, the producers (usually young, aggressive and cocksure) do.
Back many years ago Audi brought out a new model marketed to older Americans. As on all European cars, the brake and accelerator pedals were close together. But back then, older Yanks were used to cars like the Mercury Marquis, where the pedals are very far apart.
There were a series of accidents with the Audi crashing through the back of garages and the like. The NTSB said folks were jamming their feet on the gas instead of the brakes. 60 Minutes did a piece that denied that and blamed the car. No evidence--just the reporters talking to drivers.
Audi wound up taking the car off the market.
lavadora- yes, I have seen this before. All I can say is this; I have made many go arounds when the aircraft in front of me did not get off the runway in time. The engines require a few seconds to spool up. I don't know why the French captain forgot that. He was low, slow and nose high approaching the tree line. In this situation, the thrust will increase if the thrust levers are moved to the TOGA position.
Also, remember that the worst air-crash in history, not related to terrorists, had the airline's top captain at the controls of one of the 747s (Tenirefe).
A 24 hour news cycle is poison. On his "death bead" the musician Frank Zappa--I am paraphrasing here--- was asked what he felt was "wrong with today's society" (and this was a decade ago) and his response was "CNN". It has become the "News Industry" & that suggests the "Manufacturing of News". Was that A320 that landed with it's nose wheel at a 90 degree angle @ LAX a few years ago truly the "massive event of the day"? The producers must have been giddy when they saw sparks coming off of it once ground contact was made.
Indeed, 60 mins buried the Audi 5000....and Audi did everything they could, even renaming it the the Audi 100...but it was a lost cause...unfortunately the one engineering parameter that wasn't touched upon in the 60 min piece was that the statistical probability of encountering "sudden acceleration" in an Audi 5000 was either equal to or very slightly above it occurring in a Bimmer or Mercedes. The media is probably poised to make the A330 into the an Audi 5000....great analogy Gordon!
David
Hey, I just want to let you know that you do have readers that appreciate these more technical posts. It's really good to hear how these things work from someone who actually knows. I don't even know where I would go to get accurate info otherwise. Thanks for this and everything you post.
Thanks Dave! As I'm an infrequent flier and I head off this morning from MSP to MCO via ATL (MD88/B767) and back on Friday (A320 direct), your words are very reassuring.
I'll wave if I see a blue Airbus cross our path!
Tim G in MN
Hi Dave,
Just an slight correction. Proper name is 'Tenerife'
Thanks for such a great BLOG!
JOSE (La Canyada - Valencia - Spain)
http://jvgavila.com
There was also a B-52 crash a few years back (Minot AFB, I think). The pilot in command was the wing commander, who had many thousands of hours in the BUFF. Yet he managed to stall the aircraft about 200 feet over the runway. The left wing dropped and the plane nosed in, killing all aboard.
Familiarity breeds complacency. After years of flying, even the very best often forget to respect danger. Two of the very best stunt pilots, Jimmy Franklin and Bobby Younkin died a couple of years ago when they collided during an airshow practice. It can happen to anyone who has no fear or fails to respect the potential danger.
David (MCE Team)...just remember that in any design there are trade offs. And while Boeing's latest and greatest is fly-by-wire (I know that the 744 is) both manufacturers approach this differently where Airbus relies a bit more heavily on their automation (the way the Airbus ADIRS makes its magic happen) than Boeing does. There is nothing wrong with either approach and the pilots flying both know the limits and limitations.
So-called steam gauges still exist in Boeing cockpits where there is one altimeter, one airspeed indicator, etc. in case of a complete failure of the electrics. I don't know if Airbus do that. The point is that both aircraft families have what I call "the world has turned to crap" fallbacks. These aren't your grandfather's DC-3, though that is a grand old bird in its own right.
Hi, you refer to a major news outlet years ago doing a hit on Airbus, would you let me me know if this was VF? I was/am still terrified after reading it. Thanks Love your blog, like straight shooters!
Never, ever, boring! A well-explained lesson that just makes flight more and more fascinating, the more we learn. Just love that photo of the controls on the flight deck and keep coming back to it.
It's interesting to read about the A320 after completing my first flight lesson - it's a long way from the 172m I fly. Thanks again for the great blog!!
C, MN
Why didn't the flight protection system you describe prevent the Airbus crash in NYC a few years back? As I recall, accident investigators concluded that the co-pilot put excessive control inputs into the rudder pedals just after take-off; this caused the jet's rudder to fail due to excessive loads.
" If the PIC is right handed does it present any problem in providing input via the left hand?"
I am lefthanded and an avid flightsim fan.
If right handed people can make the switch to lefthanded controls as easily as us lefties can use righty controls, there should be few problems.
"However, Airbus's reasoning for making the computer have the last word is also sound"
It's more than that. Originally in the A320 software the pilot did not have the final say.
This caused at least one, possibly two, accidents (one of them in full view of the world at the Paris Airshow).
"The pilot evidently forgot that it takes turbines a few seconds to spool up to maximum thrust."
That's the one. But the pilot didn't forget anything, the computers didn't let him.
That crash was the reason the manual overrides were installed in the first place, to prevent the computers from commanding things that the pilots know to be wrong.
"There was also a B-52 crash a few years back (Minot AFB, I think). "
If that's the one I think you're referring to, classic pilot error.
Commanding a steep banking turn to look pretty for the photographers while near stall speed and forgetting the size of your wing (which I think grazed the ground) isn't a good thing.
Experience had made him cocky and careless rather than introspective and careful.
"The KLM captain, Jacob van Zanten, whose errant takeoff roll will soon kill nearly 600 people, "
A takeoff roll started because of a series of miscommunications and inattentiveness by the ground controllers who had no clear indication of the status of their runway at the time they cleared it. The wording used by the controller was interpreted by van Zanten as meaning he had takeoff clearance, though the controller later asserted he'd not intended it as such.
The controller however had been unaware that the PanAm aircraft had missed their runway turnoff (they'd failed to notify control of that fact) and that thus the runway was not clear!
His backup, who might have spotted the error and prevented the worst accident in aviation history, had been watching (or listening on the radio, I don't remember) to a football match rather than being at his station.
Radio protocols were also not in place, causing lots of missed phrases as heterodynes blocked transmissions.
Combined with fog, an overcrowded airport, controllers unfamiliar with controlling aircraft larger than a regional turboprop, and aircrew unfamiliar with the airport blundering about in near zero visibility (they were all there because their actual destination had been closed to all traffic after an ETA bomb threat), made for an accident waiting to happen.
Everyone made mistakes that evening, and as usual one person's mistake wasn't the sole reason of the accident.
Had they all flown to their actual destinations, had there been no fog, had the radio phraseology been standardised at the time (it was finally standardised as a result of the accident investigation), had people not been tired from working near the limits of their legal hours, had that football match not been on and the full tower team at their stations, had the controllers not spoken heavily accented English due to not being familiar with the language (they normally controller only local flights using their native Spanis), had had had..., things would have turned out quite differently.
Van Zanten was one of the most experienced pilots in KLM, maybe the entire world (certainly within the 747 community at the time which was of course rather young).
He'd not make a rookie mistake like taking off without clearance unless he was convinced that what he'd got was actually clearance.
His PNF had initial doubts about the meaning of what had been granted, but on asking to the tower "repeat, do we have clearance", had got an affirmative "yes, you have clearance". At Schiphol this would have meant takeoff clearance, at Tenerife it didn't but neither crewmember was aware of that as they were unfamiliar with the airport and thus went with what they did know...
david paulin- good question. OK, the protections are for energy levels, low or high, bank angles, and angle of attack, They do not prevent overuse of the controls, other than a g-limit of 2.5. There is an airspeed function to the rudder,.e., the faster you go the less the rudder will move. At slow speeds, the rudder will move with much authority, hence the tail failure at JFK.
For those hungry for something a little more technical, see
http://personales.upv.es/juaruiga/teaching/
TFC/Material/Trabajos/AIRBUS.PDF
Could I ask about the Air Caraibe document (posted by Aviatrix as "Cavalry Charge")?
It may have no connection at all with AF447, but have you any idea why nobody raised the apparent contradictions in the checklists as an issue until they were needed in earnest?
Is it clear what you should do if the A320 gets differing airspeeds? Is the documentation generally clear and consistent, or is there room for improvement?
Dave - thanks so much for the blog.
I can't think of another disaster in the modern jet era in which turbulence, either directly or indirectly, caused a high-altitude breakup of a commercial liner - perhaps I am incorrect?
That this may have happened to 447 is just unbelievable, so awful.
There are no steering wheels in the cockpit. Are those replaced by joysticks?
"OMG.. I just realized this blog is like crack.. I've checked it at least 25times today, looking for my "FIX"
LOL...
# posted by Blogger Tim 12of13"
Tim, there is a club you can join – it's called FL390 Anonymous...
Hi dave. Here's another document about adiru fails:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/AAIR/pdf/AO2008070_interim.pdf
Just a question: is it possible for a pilot to override the fi-fi's protection program?
What's happen if, due to "spikes", fifi computer continue to order pitch down to flight control?
What do you think of the Continental flight where the pilot died? The news reports indicate they did not try to revive, as he had been gone too long. Did the co-pilot flying the plane think he had just drifted off??
Jay, as far as I know, all the sidestick Airbus stuff has standby instrumentation. (ie: Attitude Indicator, Airspeed Indicator, and Altimeter)
Not sure about the FAA regulations (though I am sure they are similar)
but up here under section 705 (airline) of the Canadian Aircraft Regs, there are strict requirements with regards to redundancy in flight instrumentation (that is with multiple of, or standby instruments)
Though Dave would know better than me, since the Cessna 172 is for the mostpart the extent of my logbook
Great blog. Linked!
Signed: A very nervous frequent flyer...
Tyson...thanks. If I'd opened my eyes the answer was right in the picture Dave posted. They're on the center panel just to the left of the engine displays same as on the big Boeings and 737NGs.
I want to sign up to FL390 Anonymous also :-)
/an addicted private pilot/
A very informative blog indeed. My knowledge before this was mainly Boeing related (airline pilot friends flying Boeing) - and Cessna of course :)
dave, I also do not mind if you go a little deeper into the technical side of things. Thank you for a wonderful blog!
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